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COVID-19 and the collapse of global trade: building an 
effective public health response
Pepita Barlow, May CI van Schalkwyk, Martin McKee, Ron Labonté, David Stuckler
The scale of the COVID-19 pandemic is a consequence of international trade and globalisation, with the virus 
spreading along established trade and travel routes. However, the pandemic also affects international trade through 
reductions in both supply and demand. In this Viewpoint we describe the many implications for health and propose 
ways to mitigate them. Problems include reduced access to medical supplies (in particular, personal protective 
equipment and tests), budgetary shortfalls as a result of reduced tariffs and taxes, and a general decline in economic 
activity—leading, in many cases, to recessions, threats to social safety nets, and to increased precariousness of 
income, employment, and food security. However, in exceptional cases, the pandemic has also brought some transient 
benefits, including to the environment. Looking ahead, there will be great pressure to further liberalise rules on trade 
to encourage economic recovery, but it is essential that trade policy be informed by its many consequences for health 
to ensure that the benefits are maximised and threats are minimised through active identification and mitigation.
Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic is primarily a health crisis, but 
it has become clear that it has ramifications that extend 
to many aspects of the international order. International 
trade is especially hard hit; global merchandise trade 
recorded its largest ever one-period decline in the 
second quarter of 2020, falling 14·3% compared with 
the previous period.1 Although there has since been a 
partial rebound as lockdowns eased during summer in 
the northern hemisphere, total global merchandise trade 
for 2020 is forecast to fall by 9·2% in 2020, and a recovery 
to the precrisis trend is unlikely for several years. These 
changes to the global trading landscape have wide-
ranging consequences for physical and mental health, as 
they affect supplies of drugs and medical equip ment, 
nutrition and food security, and government income 
necessary to pay for health services.
To understand the possible health consequences of this 
evolving situation and how best to respond, it is first 
necessary to understand the reasons why trade is declining. 
Although most economic shocks are precipit ated either by 
reductions in demand (eg, due to bank failures and income 
losses) or supply (eg, with sudden increases in prices 
and rising production costs), COVID-19 has created both 
situations simultaneously. For example, by April 24, 2020, 
more than 80 countries and customs territories had intro-
duced export prohibi tions or restrictions as an immediate 
response to the pandemic.2 In a world characterised by 
integrated and often just-in-time manufacturing pro-
cesses, these actions caused marked reductions in the 
supply of manufactured goods, initially in China, but 
then elsewhere. Labour shortages at ports, caused by the 
pandemic, further slowed the movement of goods. 
Meanwhile, workplace closures in many countries and 
subsequent wage losses reduced demand for retail goods 
and traded services. Many of these trends are expected to 
continue as further lockdowns are introduced in response 
to second waves of infections.
How might the drastic decline in world trade affect 
health? There are two initial mechanisms. The first is 
through shortages of traded goods. For over a century, 
manufacturing has become increasingly globalised, with 
complex supply chains. Trade disruptions impair the 
production of goods that are dependent on imports 
(eg, for component parts), and the export or import of 
finished products.3 The second mechanism is the 
economic effect. Although critics of trade liberalisation 
appropriately question whether the benefits of trade 
liberalisation are equally distributed between and within 
countries, it is widely accepted that many firms depend 
on trade to produce goods and services and to expand 
their sales and profits.
The figure summarises selected pathways through 
which these two mechanisms affect health. We start with 
the health sector.
Effect on the health sector
Access to medical supplies
One immediate consequence that has already received 
substantial attention is the effect on access to essential 
medical supplies. The pandemic has generated an acute 
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and unprecedented degree of demand for ventilators, 
some medicines, and personal protective equipment 
(PPE)—and health-care providers and governments have 
engaged in a frantic scramble to obtain supplies. 
Although some countries (eg, China and Turkey) have 
been able to repurpose clothing manufacturing to the 
production of PPE, this move alone has not been 
adequate to meet demand, and the problem of obtaining 
medical supplies is compounded by often chaotic 
purchasing arrangements.6 For example, in the USA, 
individual states are bidding not just against each other 
but also against the federal government, thereby driving 
up prices.7
Although the challenge of scaling up supply rapidly to 
meet demand and resulting price rises are creating major 
problems in meeting the needs of health-care providers, 
in some countries this issue has been exacerbated 
by trade barriers affecting medical goods. Importing 
countries can impose tariffs to restrict trade; in the case 
of face masks, for example, tariffs can be as high as 
55% of the import value.8 These difficulties are especially 
acute in countries dependent on imports of medical 
products, such as Armenia, Brazil, and Colombia. Also, 
several countries have been unable to produce and export 
domestically manufac tured equip ment during the 
pandemic to protect domestic supply, leading to high 
procurement costs and delays else where.2 Trade restric-
tions have also constrained access to other basic health 
services, besides those needed to target COVID-19, 
including vaccines needed for mass immunisation 
campaigns.9 These issues have been compounded by 
nationalist or regionalist approaches taken in many 
countries, including the USA, which have created a 
leadership vacuum and contributed to fragmented and 
uncoor dinated pandemic responses.
One way in which countries could respond is to reduce 
temporarily all trade barriers for medical products and to 
repeal restrictive sanctions (ie, penalties imposed by states 
on each other owing to political disagreements). Pakistan, 
for example, exempted medical equipment from import 
duties, whereas Brazil eliminated tariffs on medical and 
hospital products.10 Trade can be further facilitated by the 
actions of exporters. China, for example, has compensated 
for some of the collapse in demand for its non-medical 
exports by expanding exports of PPE and medical 
equipment.11 There have also been calls for the incoming 
US administration to lift sanctions on Iran’s importation 
of medical supplies to help curb COVID-19 spread across 
the Middle East.9
Other measures can also facilitate trade. As a regional 
trading block, the EU created the COVID-19 Clearing-
house for medical equipment, to help member states to 
source supplies, and abolished temporary controls on 
exports of essential equipment (albeit somewhat 
belatedly, in response to criticisms of the EU response).12 
Other regions have also relaxed regulations to facilitate 
imports. The US Food and Drug Administration, for 
example, issued a new emergency use authorisation to 
permit the import of respirators made in China, Brazil, 
Europe, and elsewhere, which had not been previously 
authorised for sale.13
Looking ahead, a way is needed to develop equitable 
and effective purchasing mechanisms that enable all 
countries to obtain life-saving materials and any vac-
cines or treatments that are found to be effective. Gavi, 
the Vaccine Alliance and UNICEF have considerable 
experience with such mechanisms, and the Gavi COVAX 
initiative, which brings together governments, inter-
national agencies, and pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
seeks to ensure an equitable distribution of COVID-19 
vaccines.14
Budgetary shortfalls
A second challenge to health systems comes from 
budgetary shortfalls that directly result from collapsing 
trade. These shortfalls happen for two reasons. First, 
trade taxes are a major source of revenue in some low-
income countries (contributing 5–25% of total revenue) 
because they are reasonably easy to collect.13 Typically, 
trade revenues expand the fiscal space needed to fund 
health systems in the absence of other tax sources, so any 
reduction in trade renders budgets vulnerable.15 This 
effect has implications for progress towards WHO’s 
universal health coverage goal.16 Second, economic 
recession in the wake of collapsing trade, and with it 
reductions in personal and business tax revenue, affects 
developed economies and adds further pressure in 
economies that are developing.
In these circumstances, governments have to find 
additional support elsewhere—eg, by borrowing from the 
global financial institutions or regional development 
banks (depending on what the money is to be spent on). 
However, this borrowing can have adverse consequences 
if lending is subject to conditions, such as a requirement 
to reduce spending on infrastructure and essential 
services, including health, something that has been 
reported to leave countries susceptible to disease out-
breaks.17 Similarly, concerns have been raised about how 
debt repayment delay schemes currently offered to low-
income countries might impede progress towards 
universal health coverage, because the debt will not be 
cancelled and might even appreciate.18 Thus, it is essential 
that these financial institutions recognise the harm that 
they can do, and adapt their policies accordingly.
Effect on social protection
The fiscal consequences of reduced trade extend to social 
protection schemes and public services that protect 
health, such as water sanitation and education.19 These 
entities provide a buffer against the health consequences 
of economic hardship and social exclusion, so any decline 
in revenues and spending on social protection and public 
services is expected to undermine health, especially 
among families living in poverty or other precarious 
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situations, and in economic systems that are already 
strained.20 This risk reinforces the importance of 
adequate financing, with fair and effective conditions, in 
helping governments respond to the wider effects of 
COVID-19.
Effect on social determinants of health
A collapse in trade is likely to have many consequences 
for the social determinants of health. For illustration, 
two pathways have been selected: first, employment and 
income; and second, food security, nutrition, and 
unhealthy commodities.
Employment and income
People working in sectors that are dependent on 
international supply chains, or which export a large 
share of their production, are especially at risk. The 
importance of an adequate income and employment 
for good health and access to health-sustaining 
goods and services is well established.21 Equally, falling 
into poverty, losing work, and financial insecurity can 
result in physical and mental illness.22 Other people at 
great risk include those living in border areas, 
especially if there is extensive cross-border trade.23 The 
World Bank estimates that the contraction in global 
economic output as a consequence of the pandemic, 
and in particular the collapse of the many global 
supply chains on which workers in low-income and 
middle-income countries depend, will push between 
88 million and 115 million people into extreme poverty 
in 2020.24
Food security, nutrition, and unhealthy commodities
Declining trade could undermine food security as a 
result of changing access to nutritious food sources. The 
UN World Food Programme estimates that the number 
of people experiencing acute hunger will almost double 
by the end of 2020 as a result of the pandemic, adding 
130 million people to those already at risk.25 A loss of 
seasonal labour and the effect of supply-chain collapse 
on small farms in low-income countries is expected to 
have some negative consequences for outputs, whether 
for export or domestic markets.26 In high-income 
countries, the effect on food outputs might be small, at 
least for staple products, because much food production 
is now mechanised and requires fewer workers than 
elsewhere.
Yet rising food insecurity is not necessarily due to 
falling production.27 One alternative cause is the growth 
of restrictions on agricultural trade. By Oct 18, 2020, 
21 countries had announced temporary measures 
restricting food exports,28 which has exerted upward 
pressure on prices. These controls are nevertheless rare, 
and most important will be the reduced incomes of people 
involved in sectors exposed to wider supply-chain collapse, 
because an adequate income is essential to sustaining 
access to enough food.29 High-income countries are not 
exempt; in the USA, food insecurity has already doubled 
overall, and tripled among households with children.30
There is a caveat: when trade is based on unhealthy 
commodities, reductions could be beneficial.31 Trade 
liberalisation during the post-war era has fostered the 
global diffusion of ultra-processed foods and their 
ingredients, sugary soft drinks and, with them, non-
communicable diseases, such as obesity and diabetes.5 
In Canada, the amount of high-fructose corn syrup used 
in food production tripled after a 5% import tariff on 
the syrup was abolished as part of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement.32 Similarly, the liberalisation of 
tobacco and alcohol trade stimulated rising consumption 
of these commodities globally.33 Reduced trade could 
reduce consumption of these products and associated 
harms, yielding benefits to health.
Effect on environmental determinants
There are other potentially positive aspects of the 
pandemic that might seem paradoxical. Pollution 
associated with trade has direct health effects. A 2017 
study estimated that, in 2007, international trade had 
caused the shift of more than 700 000 pol lution-related 
deaths from regions that import goods, like western 
Europe, to regions that produce them, like China.5,34 High-
income countries are also major exporters of hazardous 
materials, such as elec tronic waste that releases toxicants, 
to low-income countries.35 As trade declines, so too could 
the number of lives lost in low-income countries to the 
environmental harms created by fossil fuel emissions 
and toxic chemicals.
However, it is already becoming apparent that any 
beneficial changes might be transient. Partly because of 
growing evidence about how air pollution exacerbates 
the effects of respiratory infections such as COVID-19, 
there is a compelling need for governments not to miss 
the opportunity to build upon and sustain after the 
pandemic some of the changes that have taken place, 
such as reduced travel.36 It will be necessary to return to 
past but failed efforts (eg, the Environmental Goods 
Agreement), and to find new ways of reconciling trade 
and environmental priorities, and to do so with strength-
ened global governance to ensure these opportunities are 
not squandered.37
Towards an effective public health response
What do these pathways and caveats imply for how 
policy makers might respond to the health conse-
quences of a reduction in global trade? Previous 
economic and trade crises have been followed swiftly 
by calls for greater liberalisation to sustain economies 
and liveli hoods.38 Several high-profile politicians and 
think tanks have already announced their support for 
further trade liberalisation to help the world recover 
from the COVID-19 pandemic.39 However, such calls 
often take a narrow view of trade and health, either by 
assuming that aggregate economic gains translate into 
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wide spread improvements in human welfare, or by 
focusing specifically on medical and food supplies 
while over looking other health determinants.
Although there are important benefits from continued, 
or increased, liberalisation of trade (eg, to increase 
supplies of products conducive to health, such as medi-
cines or healthy foods), there are also risks that should be 
considered. One example, noted previously, is that a 
reduction in trade can undermine fiscal space for health 
systems and social protection. It is not implicit that 
widespread tariff liberalisation will compensate for this. 
Tariff reductions might fail to yield their intended 
economic benefits and even erode government revenues 
further.28,40 Between 1970 and 2006, over 40% of low-
income countries had a net fall in total tax revenues that 
lasted more than 10 years after trade liberalisation, in part 
due to difficulties in levying domestic taxes to compensate 
for trade revenue declines following tariff cuts.8 Increases 
in trade and economic growth stimulated by reduced 
tariffs did not necessarily compensate for the loss of 
revenue from those tariffs. Governments of low-income 
countries have long been advised to consider carefully the 
revenue implications of reducing tariffs, and to ensure 
first that alternative and non-regressive tax measures are 
in place to maintain health and social spending.15
Governments can also experience pressure to restrict 
regulations on trade to sustain commerce. For example, 
multinational food, tobacco, and alcohol corporations 
have long sought to minimise regulations targeting 
their products (eg, mandatory health-warning labels) 
that could increase trade costs but which help to 
discourage unhealthy consumption and so prevent non-
commu nicable diseases.41 There is emerging evidence 
that companies seeking to maintain their sales in the 
context of collapsing trade are redoubling their efforts 
to limit these regulations, to support the economy. For 
example, several major processed-food exporters argued 
for Mexico to postpone its nutrition labelling regulations 
to help ease financial pressures caused by COVID-19.42 
However, the economic balance sheets of the unhealthy-
commodity industries ignore the rising costs of treating 
those who fall ill from consuming their products.43,44 For 
products that are harmful to health, maintaining or 
increasing the regulations that create trade and business 
costs might actually be a more effec tive route to long-
term economic recovery, by reducing downstream 
health-care costs.
Certainly, so-called protectionist measures that erect 
trade barriers and retreat from globalisation can also be 
damaging, especially if they impede flows of goods 
that are important for health, as noted earlier. There 
are also wider ramifications of protectionism. Some 
governments and businesses are looking to move 
factories closer to home to prevent future supply-chain 
shocks. The Japanese Government, for example, ear-
marked ¥220 billion (US$2 billion) to help manu-
facturers to reshore (ie, relocate) production back to 
Japan.45 This reshoring can reduce some forms of the 
pollution from fossil fuel emissions that is generated 
by the international transportation of goods, thereby 
reducing climate change and particulate air pollution. 
However, it could simply shift the location of environ-
mental damage and asso ciated health harms, especially 
if reshoring is adopted by countries with relaxed 
environmental standards.
An associated risk comes from pressure on govern-
ments to relax environmental standards to spur trade 
and recreate global supply chains. China, for example, 
has signalled its readiness to relax rules on coal power 
investment to stimulate its economy.46 This risk under-
scores the importance of maintaining regulations that 
might create trade costs but which protect health and the 
environment, especially as eco nomies recalibrate their 
trade relationships in response to COVID-19.
Conclusions
It is a cliché to say that every crisis is an opportunity. Yet 
the scale of disruption caused by the current pandemic 
provides renewed opportunities, not only for entities that 
seek to exploit the situation in ways that threaten health, 
as has often happened in the past,39 but also for 
governments, acting in the interests of their people, to 
reassess globalisation and design trade instruments that 
are conducive to good health. In doing so, they will need 
to recognise an explicit link between trade and health, 
something that should now be obvious, given how the 
initial spread of the disease occurred along established 
trade routes, as have many large-scale disease outbreaks 
throughout history.47
In the future, policy makers engaged in the use of 
trade instruments to mitigate the health effects of the 
trade collapse induced by COVID-19 should consider 
carefully the wide-ranging links between trade, trade 
policy, and the determinants of health and health 
inequalities that this Viewpoint has discussed. Effective 
global governance of trade and health will be crucial, and 
there might be fresh hope for a more co-ordinated global 
response, given President-elect Joe Biden’s favourable view 
of multilateralism. These deliberations should be done in a 
transparent manner, using participative trade governance 
structures that give health experts a seat at the table, and 
with meaningful public participation. Otherwise, the 
world will face even greater health risks in future.
National governments and global institutions are now 
preparing to create a pathway for post-pandemic recovery 
after the collapse of the global economy and trade. As part 
of this recovery, there exists a precious opportunity to 
reform trade arrangements in ways that ensure healthy 
and sustainable lives for all—something that governments 
com mitted to do when they signed up to the increasingly 
fragile UN 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. With 
the lives and livelihoods of billions of people globally now 
hanging in the balance, the opportunity must not be 
squandered.
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